Case 8 · Event 10
How did Chinese exports and US imports move around the 2025 tariffs, month by month?
China's shipments to the US “accelerated in the second half of 2024”; from January 2025 shipments of intermediate inputs to Vietnam and other ASEAN economies accelerated; as shipments to the US “fell sharply in April-May”, the decline “was offset by increased shipments to third destinations”.
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The 2025 measures raised the average effective US tariff rate “from 2.4% at the end of 2024 to 17.4%”; in a multi-country model, “The US itself suffers a significant output drop of 0.9%” in the short run.
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Duty-exclusive import prices “at the variety (country-product) level do not adjust to tariffs, implying full pass-through to duty-inclusive prices at the border”; within products, imports reallocate toward lower-priced sources.
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The papers’ questions measured again on UN Comtrade records. Each reading below is written from these numbers, not from the papers.
How this case is measured
Only reporters that have filed: the US to Jul 2026. China's own monthly files end in Dec 2024 in the store, so China's exports are read from its partners' imports.
China’s share of United States’ all goods imports: 14% in Jan–Feb 2024, 8.5% in Jul 2026. Lowest 6.8% in Apr 2026.
| Jan–Feb 2024 | 14% | 15.5% | 13.4% | 3.9% | 3% | 4.1% | 46.1% | – | +2% | yes |
| Mar 2024 | 11.9% | 15.8% | 13.1% | 3.9% | 3.1% | 4.5% | 47.8% | – | −1.5% | yes |
| Apr 2024 | 12% | 15.6% | 12.8% | 3.7% | 3.3% | 4.3% | 48.3% | – | +8.2% | yes |
| May 2024 | 13.1% | 15.7% | 12.9% | 4.2% | 3.2% | 4.5% | 46.5% | – | +4.2% | yes |
| Jun 2024 | 13.2% | 15.6% | 12.9% | 4.4% | 3.7% | 4.3% | 46% | – | +2.9% | yes |
| Jul 2024 | 14.6% | 14.3% | 12.3% | 4.2% | 4.5% | 3.9% | 46.2% | – | +12.7% | yes |
| Aug 2024 | 14.8% | 15.4% | 11.8% | 4.4% | 4.2% | 3.8% | 45.7% | – | +4.6% | yes |
| Sep 2024 | 15.4% | 15.1% | 12% | 5% | 3.7% | 3.9% | 44.9% | – | +9.7% | yes |
| Oct 2024 | 14.7% | 15.5% | 11.8% | 4.5% | 3.7% | 3.5% | 46.3% | – | +4.5% | yes |
| Nov 2024 | 14.1% | 15.1% | 12.1% | 4.5% | 3.4% | 3.7% | 47.1% | – | +7.3% | yes |
| Dec 2024 | 13.5% | 13.5% | 12.4% | 4.2% | 3.5% | 3.9% | 48.9% | – | +15% | yes |
| Jan–Feb 2025 | 12.5% | 13.5% | 12.1% | 4.2% | 3.6% | 3.3% | 50.9% | −1.5 pp | +21.6% | yes |
| Mar 2025 | 8.9% | 13.8% | 10.4% | 4.4% | 3.6% | 3.6% | 55.3% | −3 pp | +31.7% | yes |
| Apr 2025 | 9.5% | 14.9% | 10.7% | 5.4% | 5.2% | 3.6% | 50.7% | −2.4 pp | +1.7% | yes |
| May 2025 | 7.7% | 16.5% | 10.9% | 5.8% | 5.9% | 4.2% | 49.1% | −5.4 pp | +0.3% | yes |
| Jun 2025 | 7.4% | 16.6% | 11.2% | 6.7% | 6.3% | 4.3% | 47.5% | −5.8 pp | 0% | yes |
| Jul 2025 | 9.4% | 15.2% | 11% | 6.2% | 6.6% | 3.8% | 47.7% | −5.2 pp | +1.5% | yes |
| Aug 2025 | 9.9% | 16.8% | 11.2% | 6.3% | 6.8% | 3.9% | 45.1% | −4.9 pp | −5.3% | yes |
| Sep 2025 | 8.8% | 15.9% | 11.6% | 6.5% | 5.4% | 3.6% | 48.3% | −6.6 pp | −3.9% | yes |
| Oct 2025 | 9% | 17.4% | 11.3% | 6.6% | 8% | 3.3% | 44.3% | −5.7 pp | −5.2% | yes |
| Nov 2025 | 8.3% | 16.7% | 10.8% | 6.6% | 7.6% | 3.3% | 46.7% | −5.8 pp | −4.4% | yes |
| Dec 2025 | 7.8% | 14.7% | 11.3% | 6.6% | 8.7% | 4.2% | 46.7% | −5.8 pp | −0.9% | yes |
| Jan–Feb 2026 | 8.1% | 16.6% | 11.2% | 6.9% | 8.3% | 4.5% | 44.4% | −4.4 pp | −14.8% | yes |
| Mar 2026 | 7.2% | 16.7% | 11.3% | 6.8% | 8% | 4.3% | 45.7% | −1.7 pp | −11.6% | yes |
| Apr 2026 | 6.8% | 16.6% | 11.6% | 6.8% | 8% | 4.5% | 45.6% | −2.7 pp | +8.8% | yes |
| May 2026 | 7.8% | 17.1% | 11.6% | 7% | 7.8% | 4.3% | 44.4% | +0.1 pp | +12.9% | yes |
| Jun 2026 | 8.2% | 17.1% | 11.7% | 8% | 6.4% | 4.9% | 43.7% | +0.8 pp | +19.5% | yes |
| Jul 2026 | 8.5% | 17.9% | 10% | 8% | 7.6% | 5% | 43% | −0.9 pp | +13.5% | yes |
Imports of all goods by United States from China, against a year earlier: −19% in Apr 2025 and −40.9% in May 2025.
| Apr 2025 | Apr 2024 | −19% |
| May 2025 | May 2024 | −40.9% |
United States’ share of China’s all goods exports: 12.5% in Jan 2024, 9.3% in Jun 2026. Lowest 8.2% in Jan 2026.
| Jan 2024 | 12.5% | 13.6% | 16.6% | 57.4% | – | +0.8% | yes |
| Feb 2024 | 12.8% | 13.4% | 16.7% | 57.1% | – | +1.8% | yes |
| Mar 2024 | 12.4% | 13.5% | 17.4% | 56.6% | – | +1.8% | yes |
| Apr 2024 | 12.1% | 13.6% | 18.1% | 56.3% | – | +3.3% | yes |
| May 2024 | 11.8% | 14.1% | 17.5% | 56.6% | – | +3.1% | yes |
| Jun 2024 | 12.2% | 14% | 17.1% | 56.8% | – | +5% | yes |
| Jul 2024 | 12.8% | 13.8% | 17.1% | 56.3% | – | +7.1% | yes |
| Aug 2024 | 13.1% | 13.5% | 17.3% | 56.1% | – | +9.5% | yes |
| Sep 2024 | 13.5% | 13% | 17.8% | 55.6% | – | +11.8% | yes |
| Oct 2024 | 13.3% | 12.8% | 18.1% | 55.9% | – | +11.6% | yes |
| Nov 2024 | 13% | 12.9% | 18% | 56.2% | – | +11.1% | yes |
| Dec 2024 | 12.5% | 13.6% | 16.9% | 57% | – | +11.9% | yes |
| Jan 2025 | 13.5% | 13.3% | 17.3% | 55.9% | +1 pp | +3.2% | no |
| Feb 2025 | 14.2% | 12.3% | 18.6% | 54.9% | +1.4 pp | −1.6% | no |
| Mar 2025 | 14.4% | 11% | 21.3% | 53.4% | +1.9 pp | −8.5% | no |
| Apr 2025 | 12.3% | 11.4% | 21.9% | 54.4% | +0.2 pp | −8.6% | no |
| May 2025 | 10.5% | 12.2% | 22.1% | 55.2% | −1.3 pp | −11.3% | no |
| Jun 2025 | 9.1% | 12.6% | 22.4% | 56% | −3.1 pp | −13% | no |
| Jul 2025 | 9% | 12.5% | 22.7% | 55.8% | −3.8 pp | −14.1% | no |
| Aug 2025 | 9.5% | 12.4% | 22.6% | 55.5% | −3.5 pp | −15.2% | no |
| Sep 2025 | 9.7% | 12.2% | 22.5% | 55.6% | −3.8 pp | −15.1% | no |
| Oct 2025 | 9.3% | 11.9% | 22.7% | 56.1% | −4 pp | −16.3% | no |
| Nov 2025 | 8.7% | 12% | 23.3% | 56% | −4.3 pp | −15.9% | no |
| Dec 2025 | 8.4% | 12.6% | 22.8% | 56.3% | −4 pp | −15.6% | no |
| Jan 2026 | 8.2% | 13.2% | 21.8% | 56.8% | −5.3 pp | −10.3% | no |
| Feb 2026 | 8.3% | 13.6% | 21.3% | 56.9% | −6 pp | −3.8% | no |
| Mar 2026 | 8.3% | 13.3% | 21.3% | 57.1% | −6 pp | +3.1% | no |
| Apr 2026 | 8.2% | 13.3% | 21.6% | 56.9% | −4.1 pp | +3.9% | no |
| May 2026 | 8.6% | 13.3% | 21.3% | 56.9% | −1.9 pp | +4.1% | no |
| Jun 2026 | 9.3% | 12.2% | 21.7% | 56.9% | +0.2 pp | +3.5% | no |
Imports of all goods by ASEAN from China, against a year earlier: +12.4% in Mar 2025 and +19.4% in Jun 2025.
| Mar 2025 | Mar 2024 | +12.4% |
| Jun 2025 | Jun 2024 | +19.4% |
China’s share of United States’ all goods imports: 13.8% in Dec 2024, 8.3% in Jun 2026 (−5.5 pp).
| United States | China | 13.8% | 8.3% | −5.5 pp |
Set a tariff by partner and product, entered as the share of that partner's flow it removes, and see the shift in other suppliers' shares it would take to keep supply whole
| Supplier | Share now | Share after | Change, pp | Its own imports from the partner |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Smaller suppliers | 27.1% | 29.2% | +2.2 pp | |
| Mexico | 15.2% | 16.4% | +1.2 pp | 20.5% |
| China | 13.8% | 6.9% | −6.9 pp | |
| Canada | 12.5% | 13.5% | +1 pp | 11.7% |
| Germany | 4.9% | 5.3% | +0.4 pp | 12.5% |
| Japan | 4.5% | 4.9% | +0.4 pp | 22.5% |
| Vietnam | 4.2% | 4.6% | +0.3 pp | 42.1% |
| Korea | 4% | 4.4% | +0.3 pp | 22.2% |
| Taiwan | 3.5% | 3.8% | +0.3 pp | 21.4% |
| Ireland | 3.1% | 3.3% | +0.2 pp | 8.9% |
| India | 2.7% | 2.9% | +0.2 pp | 18.4% |
| Italy | 2.3% | 2.5% | +0.2 pp | 9.2% |
| UK | 2.1% | 2.2% | +0.2 pp | 12.8% |
The largest other exporters, by share of world exports
First-round arithmetic on trade shares, not a forecast: an importer’s exposure is its import share from the shocked suppliers × the cut. No stocks, no new suppliers, no price changes.
The network has values, not prices or tariffs: Ahn, Rotunno and Ruta need tariff lines and unit values to find full pass-through and the shift toward cheaper sources, and Zhao's output and price effects come from a multi-country model. Frontloading is a shift in timing that later months reverse, so a single month's change on a year earlier can mislead; reporters file late, and the 2026 months cover only the economies that have filed.
datasteg: the flow sites
money-flow
Where money is made and where it goes: central bank and bank money, and cross-border positions by country pair.
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The world trade network and ten product chains from ore to product, with the events that moved them.
global-network
Funding and trade together: how economies earn, who funds whom against who trades with whom, and what past shocks did to both.
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