Case 1 · Event 4
How much of the 2020 trade collapse came from lockdowns abroad rather than from demand, and through which flows?
International spillovers from lockdowns “accounted for up to 60 percent of the observed decline in trade in the early phase of the pandemic, but their effect was shortlived, concentrated among goods produced in key global value chains”.
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In a multi-country model of the pandemic's labour-supply shocks, Europe's major car producers see “one-third of the decline in the value added of the car sector attributable to spillovers via supply chains within and across borders”.
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A multi-sector model of 64 countries traces how the pandemic's labour-supply shock travelled through supply chains: “One quarter of the total model-implied real GDP decline is due to transmission through global supply chains.”
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The papers’ questions measured again on UN Comtrade records. Each reading below is written from these numbers, not from the papers.
Imports of all goods by the 115 economies that filed every month, against a year earlier: −23.4% in Apr 2020 and −27.2% in May 2020.
| Apr 2020 | Apr 2019 | −23.4% |
| May 2020 | May 2019 | −27.2% |
Imports of all goods by the 115 economies that filed every month, against a year earlier: lowest of Jun 2020–Dec 2020 −10.8% in Jul 2020; first month above a year earlier Sep 2020 (+1.3%); Oct 2020 fell back to −2.8%; above it every month from Nov 2020.
| Jun 2020 | Jun 2019 | −9.6% |
| Jul 2020 | Jul 2019 | −10.8% |
| Aug 2020 | Aug 2019 | −7.7% |
| Sep 2020 | Sep 2019 | +1.3% |
| Oct 2020 | Oct 2019 | −2.8% |
| Nov 2020 | Nov 2019 | +3.8% |
| Dec 2020 | Dec 2019 | +8.4% |
Imports of car parts by the 115 economies that filed every month, against a year earlier: lowest of Jan–Feb 2020–Jun 2020 −57.3% in May 2020; highest −4.8% in Jan–Feb 2020.
| Jan–Feb 2020 | Jan–Feb 2019 | −4.8% |
| Mar 2020 | Mar 2019 | −15.7% |
| Apr 2020 | Apr 2019 | −56.1% |
| May 2020 | May 2019 | −57.3% |
| Jun 2020 | Jun 2019 | −27.2% |
Imports of integrated circuits by the 115 economies that filed every month, against a year earlier: lowest of Jan–Feb 2020–Jun 2020 −0.3% in May 2020; back above a year earlier from Jun 2020 (+10.8%).
| Jan–Feb 2020 | Jan–Feb 2019 | +8.4% |
| Mar 2020 | Mar 2019 | +8.4% |
| Apr 2020 | Apr 2019 | +3.5% |
| May 2020 | May 2019 | −0.3% |
| Jun 2020 | Jun 2019 | +10.8% |
Imports of the 115 economies that filed every month from China against their imports from everyone else, on a year earlier: Jan–Feb 2020: −12.3% against −1.7% and Mar 2020: −16.1% against −6.5%.
| Jan–Feb 2020 | −12.3% | −1.7% |
| Mar 2020 | −16.1% | −6.5% |
Imports of the 90 economies that filed every month from European Union (27) against their imports from everyone else, on a year earlier: Apr 2020: −24.6% against −19.4% and May 2020: −30.5% against −25.5%.
| Apr 2020 | −24.6% | −19.4% |
| May 2020 | −30.5% | −25.5% |
Close China (as in February 2020) or Europe (as in April 2020) and see whose car-parts imports were most exposed, and which car makers one stage down
| Importer | At risk, share of its imports | Its other suppliers would ship |
|---|---|---|
| 35.2% | +54% | |
| 29.2% | +41% | |
| 21.8% | +28% | |
| 17.8% | +22% | |
| 16.7% | +20% | |
| 16.1% | +19% | |
| 15.3% | +18% | |
| 12.9% | +15% | |
| 12.5% | +14% | |
| 11.8% | +13% | |
| 11.6% | +13% | |
| 10.1% | +11% |
Who could fill the gap: Japan, 35.2% of its imports
The suppliers it already buys from, in proportion to their shares: each would have to ship 54% more. Share now, then the part of the gap it would take:
The largest other exporters, by share of world exports
Passenger cars
Upper bound (100% pass-through, no use share). This stage feeds only this chain, so the chain file gives it no use share and the whole shortfall passes down.
10.3% of world passenger cars exports at risk in the first round, summed over the 21 large exporters with an exposure upstream. The 8 listed below carry 9.3%.
| Exporter | Its exposure upstream | World exports at risk |
|---|---|---|
| Japan | 35.2% | 5.2% |
| Korea | 29.2% | 1.5% |
| United States | 11.8% | 0.86% |
| Germany | 3.2% | 0.59% |
| Mexico | 6.8% | 0.47% |
| Canada | 5.8% | 0.31% |
| UK | 3.7% | 0.19% |
| Thailand | 12.9% | 0.15% |
An exporter of the next stage loses its share of world exports × its own exposure upstream (× the use share). Exporters on a closed route lose their own exports × the cut. Exposure upstream is the share of its imported car parts and engines that came from the closed supplier, not of all the car parts and engines it uses: where most are made at home (Japan, Korea, Germany for car parts), it overstates the risk.
First-round arithmetic on trade shares, not a forecast: an importer’s exposure is its import share from the shocked suppliers × the cut. No stocks, no new suppliers, no price changes.
Customs values cannot tell a supply shock from a demand shock: the fall is the same number either way. Aiyar et al. separate the two with an import-demand model and their partners' lockdown stringency, Boranova et al. and Bonadio et al. with multi-country models of labour supply. Values also move with prices (oil fell sharply in 2020), and the scenario's first-round map assumes no stocks and no substitution.
datasteg: the flow sites
money-flow
Where money is made and where it goes: central bank and bank money, and cross-border positions by country pair.
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The world trade network and ten product chains from ore to product, with the events that moved them.
global-network
Funding and trade together: how economies earn, who funds whom against who trades with whom, and what past shocks did to both.
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