Case 4 · Event 6
Could Europe replace Russian gas, and who paid for it elsewhere?
“Alternative sources could replace up to 70 percent of Russian gas”, enough to ride out a disruption of about six months; in a longer full shut-off, Hungary, the Slovak Republic and Czechia would in the short term “face a risk of shortages of as much as 40 percent of gas consumption”.
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Counting the global LNG market, the adverse impact of a Russian gas cut-off on the EU “shrinks five-fold”, but “other LNG importers (such as Japan, South Korea, and Pakistan) see adverse effects from higher prices”.
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The papers’ questions measured again on UN Comtrade records. Each reading below is written from these numbers, not from the papers.
How this case is measured
Pipeline gas (2711.21) and LNG (2711.11) share the stage, so the measures below split it by code. EU27 as one importer means its members' imports from non-members, so gas resold inside the EU is not counted twice.
Russia’s share of European Union (27)’s pipeline gas (2711.21) imports: 54.5% in 2019, 17.1% in 2025. Lowest 15.9% in 2023.
| 2019 | 54.5% | 11.9% | 0% | 0% | 20% | 0% | 13.5% | – | −26.9% | yes |
| 2020 | 52% | 14.5% | 0.01% | 0% | 22% | 0.01% | 11.5% | −2.5 pp | −36.1% | yes |
| 2021 | 48.9% | 15% | 0.02% | 0% | 14.8% | 9.2% | 12% | −3.1 pp | +207% | yes |
| 2022 | 31.7% | 18.8% | 0.67% | 0% | 14.6% | 12.9% | 21.3% | −17.2 pp | +155% | yes |
| 2023 | 15.9% | 24.2% | 0.47% | 0.29% | 25.2% | 10.9% | 23.1% | −15.8 pp | −51.8% | yes |
| 2024 | 22.2% | 23.7% | 0.4% | 0.14% | 27% | 11.1% | 15.4% | +6.3 pp | −27% | yes |
| 2025 | 17.1% | 28.3% | 0.37% | 0% | 25% | 12.3% | 17.1% | −5.1 pp | −1.5% | yes |
Russia’s share of European Union (27)’s LNG (2711.11) imports: 12.7% in 2019, 15.8% in 2025. Highest 21.8% in 2021.
| 2019 | 12.7% | 13.3% | 11.9% | 19% | 13.9% | 0% | 29.1% | – | +34.2% | yes |
| 2020 | 14.5% | 3% | 19.2% | 16.4% | 16.9% | 0% | 30% | +1.8 pp | −36.9% | yes |
| 2021 | 21.8% | 0.22% | 29.3% | 16.7% | 10.7% | 0% | 21.4% | +7.2 pp | +158% | yes |
| 2022 | 14.4% | 3.2% | 43.3% | 14.4% | 4.3% | 0% | 20.3% | −7.4 pp | +315% | yes |
| 2023 | 12.9% | 4.8% | 43.5% | 12.1% | 9.7% | 0% | 16.9% | −1.5 pp | −42.3% | yes |
| 2024 | 19.7% | 4.8% | 41.5% | 9.5% | 12.1% | 0% | 12.4% | +6.8 pp | −42.2% | yes |
| 2025 | 15.8% | 1.9% | 52.9% | 8.5% | 7.6% | 0% | 13.3% | −3.9 pp | +33.4% | yes |
Russia’s share of European Union (27)’s pipeline gas (2711.21) imports: 48.9% in 2021, 22.2% in 2024 (−26.8 pp).
| European Union (27) | Russia | 48.9% | 22.2% | −26.8 pp |
United States’ share of European Union (27)’s LNG (2711.11) imports: 29.3% in 2021, 41.5% in 2024 (+12.3 pp).
| European Union (27) | United States | 29.3% | 41.5% | +12.3 pp |
Australia held 23% of world LNG (2711.11) exports in 2021 and 21.3% in 2024; the largest gain among the top ten: Qatar, +2 pp.
| 2021 | 1 | Australia | 23% |
| 2021 | 2 | United States | 18.8% |
| 2021 | 3 | Qatar | 17.7% |
| 2021 | 4 | Russia | 8.9% |
| 2021 | 5 | Malaysia | 6.3% |
| 2021 | 6 | Nigeria | 3.5% |
| 2021 | 7 | Indonesia | 3.1% |
| 2021 | 8 | Oman | 2.9% |
| 2021 | 9 | Papua New Guinea | 2.5% |
| 2021 | 10 | Algeria | 2% |
| 2024 | 1 | Australia | 21.3% |
| 2024 | 2 | Qatar | 19.7% |
| 2024 | 3 | United States | 17.8% |
| 2024 | 4 | Russia | 8% |
| 2024 | 5 | Malaysia | 6.8% |
| 2024 | 6 | Oman | 3.3% |
| 2024 | 7 | Indonesia | 3.2% |
| 2024 | 8 | Nigeria | 3% |
| 2024 | 9 | Papua New Guinea | 2.4% |
| 2024 | 10 | Algeria | 2.3% |
Australia’s share of Japan’s LNG (2711.11) imports: 40.4% in 2019, 39.8% in 2025. Lowest 36% in 2021.
| 2019 | 40.4% | 11.7% | 4.5% | 11.3% | 7.8% | 3.3% | 21% | – | −7% | yes |
| 2020 | 40.2% | 11.3% | 7% | 13.1% | 7.8% | 3.5% | 17.1% | −0.2 pp | −24.7% | yes |
| 2021 | 36% | 11% | 11% | 12.5% | 8.7% | 2.4% | 18.3% | −4.2 pp | +29.7% | yes |
| 2022 | 43.1% | 4.8% | 6.8% | 15.2% | 8% | 2.9% | 19.3% | +7 pp | +64.9% | yes |
| 2023 | 42.6% | 5.1% | 7.2% | 15% | 8.9% | 3% | 18.2% | −0.4 pp | −27.2% | yes |
| 2024 | 38.8% | 4.6% | 8.7% | 15.1% | 8.8% | 4.7% | 19.4% | −3.9 pp | −12% | yes |
| 2025 | 39.8% | 5.6% | 7% | 14.4% | 8.8% | 4.1% | 20.2% | +1.1 pp | −7.6% | yes |
Cut Russian pipeline gas by 0–100% and see each EU importer's gap, and the LNG it would have to draw from the suppliers Asia buys from
| Importer | At risk, share of its imports | Its other suppliers would ship |
|---|---|---|
| 100% | none | |
| 100% | none | |
| 92.7% | +1,270% | |
| 90.3% | +930% | |
| 79% | +376% | |
| 76.3% | +322% | |
| 67.9% | +212% | |
| 66% | +194% | |
| 56% | +127% | |
| 51.9% | +108% | |
| 50.5% | +102% | |
| 0% | – |
Who could fill the gap: Czechia, 100% of its imports
It buys from no other supplier in the table: nothing fills the gap in the first round.
The largest other exporters, by share of world exports
Ammonia
0% of world ammonia exports at risk in the first round, summed over the 0 large exporters with an exposure upstream. The 8 listed below carry 0%.
| Exporter | Its exposure upstream | World exports at risk |
|---|---|---|
| Trinidad and Tobago | not a large importer | – |
| Russia | not a large importer | – |
| Indonesia | not a large importer | – |
| Algeria | not a large importer | – |
| Saudi Arabia | not a large importer | – |
| Egypt | not a large importer | – |
| Qatar | not a large importer | – |
| Netherlands | not a large importer | – |
An exporter of the next stage loses its share of world exports × its own exposure upstream (× the use share). Exporters on a closed route lose their own exports × the cut. Exposure upstream is the share of its imported pipeline gas (2711.21) that came from the closed supplier, not of all the pipeline gas (2711.21) it uses: where most are made at home (Japan, Korea, Germany for car parts), it overstates the risk.
First-round arithmetic on trade shares, not a forecast: an importer’s exposure is its import share from the shocked suppliers × the cut. No stocks, no new suppliers, no price changes.
Trade shows flows, not balances: storage, demand cuts and fuel switching, which decided whether Europe ran short, are outside customs data, and so are the prices through which, in Albrizio et al.'s general-equilibrium model, other importers paid. Pipeline gas can be recorded against the transit country or the first EU buyer rather than Russia. Di Bella et al. go further with country gas balances and infrastructure bottlenecks.
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