Since the war in Ukraine, trade and FDI between geopolitically distant blocs fell relative to flows within blocs, “roughly 12% and 20%, respectively”; “nonaligned ‘connector’ countries are rapidly gaining importance”.
In US tariff-line import data, “China’s share of US imports fell from 22 to 16 percent” between 2017 and 2022, and the paper shows that the decline is due to US tariffs.
Of six Asian connectors, only Vietnam shows clear evidence: “Vietnam appears to have benefited from trade reallocation, with increased domestic content in its exports to the US”, instead of significant transshipment of Chinese exports.
Firm-level supplier data show chains from China to the US lengthening, “where firms from other jurisdictions, notably in Asia, have interposed themselves in the supply chain”.
Between 2017 and 2023 the quarter-on-quarter change in trade volumes “was 2.5% lower on average between geopolitically distant countries relative to those that were closer”.
The papers’ questions measured again on UN Comtrade records. Each reading below is written from these numbers, not from the papers.
Trade between the narrow West and East blocs as a share of world trade, 1990–2024
Trade between West (narrow bloc) and East (narrow bloc): 1.6% of world trade in 1990, 9.3% in 2024. Peak: 11.9% in 2021.
0%20%40%60%
19901995200020052010201520202024
Within West (narrow bloc) 29%
Within East (narrow bloc) 1.1%
Between the blocs 9.3%
Shares of world trade in the product; trade with economies in neither bloc is the rest.Source: UN Comtrade, Final data, HS6; mirror rule.
1990
47.3%
0%
1.6%
1991
46.7%
0%
2%
1992
46.1%
0.16%
3.7%
1993
42.6%
0.21%
4.2%
1994
42.9%
0.13%
4.4%
1995
43.1%
0.12%
4.3%
1996
42.5%
0.24%
4.3%
1997
41.8%
0.22%
4.5%
1998
44.8%
0.27%
4.7%
1999
44.1%
0.22%
4.9%
2000
41.2%
0.27%
5.5%
2001
42%
0.33%
6.1%
2002
41.9%
0.35%
6.8%
2003
42%
0.37%
7.4%
2004
40.6%
0.42%
8.1%
2005
38.9%
0.4%
8.7%
2006
37.9%
0.45%
9.3%
2007
37.6%
0.54%
9.7%
2008
35.3%
0.62%
9.8%
2009
34.8%
0.58%
10.4%
2010
31.6%
0.66%
11%
2011
30.7%
0.77%
10.9%
2012
29.1%
0.79%
10.7%
2013
29.6%
0.74%
11.1%
2014
30.1%
0.72%
11.3%
2015
30.5%
0.62%
11.4%
2016
31.3%
0.7%
11.2%
2017
30.2%
0.79%
11.4%
2018
30.3%
0.8%
11.3%
2019
30.4%
0.85%
11%
2020
30.4%
0.86%
11.7%
2021
29.3%
0.87%
11.9%
2022
29%
0.81%
10.9%
2023
30.3%
1.1%
9.6%
2024
29.4%
1.1%
9.3%
The same by month, 12-month sums, to December 2024 (the last complete month)
Trade between West (narrow bloc) and East (narrow bloc): 11.3% of world trade in Jan 2018, 9.3% in Dec 2024. Peak: 12.2% in Mar 2021.
0%10%20%30%40%
201920202021202220232024
Within West (narrow bloc) 30%
Within East (narrow bloc) 1.1%
Between the blocs 9.3%
Shares of world trade in the product; trade with economies in neither bloc is the rest.Source: UN Comtrade monthly data, all reporters that filed; mirror rule; lens L (12-month sum).
Jan 2018
30.3%
0.78%
11.3%
Feb 2018
30.4%
0.79%
11.4%
Mar 2018
30.6%
0.79%
11.4%
Apr 2018
30.7%
0.79%
11.4%
May 2018
30.7%
0.79%
11.4%
Jun 2018
30.8%
0.79%
11.4%
Jul 2018
30.7%
0.79%
11.3%
Aug 2018
30.6%
0.78%
11.4%
Sep 2018
30.5%
0.79%
11.3%
Oct 2018
30.5%
0.8%
11.4%
Nov 2018
30.4%
0.8%
11.4%
Dec 2018
30.4%
0.8%
11.3%
Jan 2019
30.4%
0.81%
11.3%
Feb 2019
30.4%
0.81%
11.3%
Mar 2019
30.4%
0.81%
11.2%
Apr 2019
30.4%
0.82%
11.2%
May 2019
30.4%
0.82%
11.2%
Jun 2019
30.4%
0.83%
11.2%
Jul 2019
30.4%
0.83%
11.1%
Aug 2019
30.4%
0.83%
11.1%
Sep 2019
30.5%
0.84%
11.1%
Oct 2019
30.6%
0.84%
11%
Nov 2019
30.6%
0.84%
11%
Dec 2019
30.6%
0.85%
11%
Jan 2020
30.7%
0.86%
10.9%
Feb 2020
30.7%
0.87%
10.8%
Mar 2020
30.7%
0.87%
10.8%
Apr 2020
30.5%
0.87%
10.9%
May 2020
30.4%
0.88%
11%
Jun 2020
30.4%
0.88%
11.2%
Jul 2020
30.5%
0.89%
11.3%
Aug 2020
30.6%
0.89%
11.3%
Sep 2020
30.6%
0.89%
11.4%
Oct 2020
30.6%
0.89%
11.5%
Nov 2020
30.7%
0.88%
11.6%
Dec 2020
30.7%
0.87%
11.7%
Jan 2021
30.6%
0.86%
11.8%
Feb 2021
30.5%
0.86%
12%
Mar 2021
30.4%
0.87%
12.2%
Apr 2021
30.5%
0.87%
12.2%
May 2021
30.5%
0.86%
12.1%
Jun 2021
30.5%
0.86%
12%
Jul 2021
30.3%
0.85%
11.9%
Aug 2021
30.1%
0.86%
11.9%
Sep 2021
30%
0.86%
12%
Oct 2021
29.8%
0.87%
11.9%
Nov 2021
29.7%
0.88%
11.9%
Dec 2021
29.5%
0.89%
11.9%
Jan 2022
29.4%
0.87%
12%
Feb 2022
29.4%
0.86%
12%
Mar 2022
29.4%
0.85%
11.9%
Apr 2022
29.4%
0.83%
11.8%
May 2022
29.4%
0.83%
11.7%
Jun 2022
29.3%
0.82%
11.6%
Jul 2022
29.2%
0.82%
11.5%
Aug 2022
29.2%
0.83%
11.4%
Sep 2022
29.1%
0.83%
11.3%
Oct 2022
29.1%
0.84%
11.2%
Nov 2022
29.2%
0.84%
11.1%
Dec 2022
29.3%
0.84%
10.9%
Jan 2023
29.6%
0.84%
10.7%
Feb 2023
29.7%
0.85%
10.6%
Mar 2023
29.7%
0.88%
10.4%
Apr 2023
29.8%
0.92%
10.3%
May 2023
30%
0.95%
10.3%
Jun 2023
30.2%
0.99%
10.2%
Jul 2023
30.4%
1%
10.1%
Aug 2023
30.6%
1%
9.9%
Sep 2023
30.7%
1%
9.8%
Oct 2023
30.7%
1.1%
9.8%
Nov 2023
30.8%
1.1%
9.7%
Dec 2023
30.8%
1.1%
9.6%
Jan 2024
30.6%
1.1%
9.5%
Feb 2024
30.6%
1.1%
9.5%
Mar 2024
30.5%
1.1%
9.5%
Apr 2024
30.5%
1.1%
9.4%
May 2024
30.4%
1.1%
9.4%
Jun 2024
30.3%
1.1%
9.4%
Jul 2024
30.2%
1.1%
9.4%
Aug 2024
30%
1.1%
9.4%
Sep 2024
30%
1.1%
9.4%
Oct 2024
30%
1.1%
9.4%
Nov 2024
29.9%
1.1%
9.4%
Dec 2024
29.8%
1.1%
9.3%
Shares of US imports by partner, all goods
China’s share of United States’ all goods imports: 19.7% in 2013, 13.8% in 2024.
0%20%40%60%
2013201520172019202120232024
China 14%
Mexico 15%
Vietnam 4.2%
Canada 13%
Taiwan 3.5%
Korea 4%
Other 47%
Source: UN Comtrade, Final data, HS6; mirror rule.
2013
19.7%
12.2%
1.1%
14.5%
1.7%
2.8%
48%
–
−0.3%
yes
2014
20.2%
12.3%
1.3%
14.7%
1.7%
3%
46.8%
+0.4 pp
+3.6%
yes
2015
21.8%
12.9%
1.7%
13.1%
1.8%
3.2%
45.5%
+1.6 pp
−4%
yes
2016
21.4%
13.2%
1.9%
12.6%
1.8%
3.2%
45.9%
−0.4 pp
−2.9%
yes
2017
21.9%
13.1%
2%
12.7%
1.8%
3.1%
45.4%
+0.4 pp
+7%
yes
2018
21.6%
13.4%
2%
12.5%
1.8%
2.9%
45.9%
−0.3 pp
+8.6%
yes
2019
18.4%
14.1%
2.7%
12.7%
2.2%
3.1%
46.8%
−3.2 pp
−1.7%
yes
2020
19%
13.7%
3.5%
11.5%
2.6%
3.3%
46.5%
+0.6 pp
−6.3%
yes
2021
18.5%
13.2%
3.7%
12.4%
2.8%
3.4%
46.1%
−0.6 pp
+21.9%
yes
2022
17.1%
13.6%
4%
13.2%
2.8%
3.6%
45.6%
−1.4 pp
+15%
yes
2023
14.1%
15.2%
3.8%
13.6%
2.8%
3.8%
46.8%
−2.9 pp
−6.1%
yes
2024
13.8%
15.2%
4.2%
12.6%
3.5%
4%
46.7%
−0.4 pp
+5.9%
yes
China's share of US imports, 2017 against 2022 (Freund et al.: 22 to 16 percent)
China’s share of United States’ all goods imports: 21.9% in 2017, 17.1% in 2022 (−4.8 pp).
201721.9%
202217.1%
Source: UN Comtrade, Final data, HS6; mirror rule.
United States
China
21.9%
17.1%
−4.8 pp
Connectors: change in third economies' share of US imports against change in their share of China's exports, 2013–17 to 2018–23 (Gopinath et al., Fig. 4A): All goods
Largest gain in share of United States’ imports, 2013–2017 to 2018–2023: Vietnam, +1.6 pp (its share of China’s exports +1 pp).
→ Change in share of United States’ imports↑ Change in share of China’s exports
Each dot is a third economy: the change between the averages of 2013–2017 and 2018–2023; dot area is its share of the importer’s imports.Source: UN Comtrade, Final data, HS6; mirror rule.
Vietnam
+1.6 pp
+1 pp
3.3%
Japan
−0.8 pp
−1.3 pp
5.1%
Hong Kong
−0.1 pp
−2 pp
0.2%
Mexico
+1.1 pp
+0.2 pp
13.9%
Taiwan
+0.7 pp
+0.3 pp
2.5%
Canada
−0.9 pp
−0.1 pp
12.6%
Germany
−0.3 pp
+0.6 pp
4.9%
Saudi Arabia
−0.8 pp
+0.1 pp
0.6%
Ireland
+0.8 pp
+0.1 pp
2.5%
Venezuela
−0.8 pp
−0.1 pp
0.13%
Switzerland
+0.6 pp
+0.1 pp
2%
India
+0.5 pp
+0.2 pp
2.5%
UAE
+0.1 pp
+0.6 pp
0.19%
Korea
+0.3 pp
+0.3 pp
3.3%
Thailand
+0.4 pp
+0.2 pp
1.6%
Poland
+0.1 pp
+0.4 pp
0.36%
Indonesia
0 pp
+0.4 pp
0.92%
Netherlands
+0.3 pp
+0.1 pp
1.2%
Israel
−0.3 pp
+0.1 pp
0.71%
Malaysia
+0.3 pp
+0.2 pp
1.7%
Russia
−0.2 pp
+0.2 pp
0.69%
Singapore
+0.3 pp
−0.1 pp
1.1%
Czechia
0 pp
+0.3 pp
0.23%
Italy
+0.3 pp
+0.1 pp
2.2%
UK
−0.2 pp
+0.1 pp
2.2%
Philippines
0 pp
+0.3 pp
0.49%
Cambodia
+0.2 pp
+0.1 pp
0.29%
Spain
+0.1 pp
+0.2 pp
0.7%
Australia
0 pp
+0.2 pp
0.47%
Kuwait
−0.3 pp
0 pp
0.05%
Türkiye
+0.2 pp
−0.1 pp
0.51%
Iraq
−0.2 pp
+0.1 pp
0.27%
Bangladesh
0 pp
+0.2 pp
0.28%
Brazil
−0.1 pp
+0.2 pp
1.2%
Angola
−0.2 pp
−0.1 pp
0.05%
Colombia
−0.2 pp
0 pp
0.53%
France
−0.1 pp
+0.1 pp
1.9%
Algeria
−0.1 pp
−0.1 pp
0.09%
Nigeria
−0.1 pp
+0.1 pp
0.15%
Slovakia
+0.1 pp
0 pp
0.2%
Austria
+0.1 pp
+0.1 pp
0.54%
South Africa
+0.1 pp
0 pp
0.42%
Slovenia
0 pp
+0.1 pp
0.07%
Egypt
0 pp
+0.1 pp
0.1%
Hungary
0 pp
+0.1 pp
0.24%
Ecuador
−0.1 pp
0 pp
0.29%
Sweden
+0.1 pp
0 pp
0.52%
Panama
0 pp
−0.1 pp
0.02%
Uzbekistan
0 pp
+0.1 pp
0%
North Korea
0 pp
−0.1 pp
0%
Portugal
0 pp
+0.1 pp
0.18%
Denmark
+0.1 pp
0 pp
0.41%
Ukraine
0 pp
+0.1 pp
0.05%
Trinidad and Tobago
−0.1 pp
0 pp
0.14%
Chile
0 pp
0 pp
0.49%
Argentina
0 pp
−0.1 pp
0.2%
Ethiopia
0 pp
−0.1 pp
0.02%
Romania
0 pp
+0.1 pp
0.11%
Greece
0 pp
+0.1 pp
0.07%
Costa Rica
−0.1 pp
0 pp
0.25%
Connectors: change in third economies' share of US imports against change in their share of China's exports, 2013–17 to 2018–23 (Gopinath et al., Fig. 4A): Solar modules
Largest gain in share of United States’ imports, 2013–2017 to 2018–2023: Vietnam, +19.1 pp (its share of China’s exports +4.5 pp).
→ Change in share of United States’ imports↑ Change in share of China’s exports
Each dot is a third economy: the change between the averages of 2013–2017 and 2018–2023; dot area is its share of the importer’s imports.Source: UN Comtrade, Final data, HS6; mirror rule.
Vietnam
+19.1 pp
+4.5 pp
22.6%
Japan
−3 pp
−11.8 pp
5.3%
Thailand
+10 pp
+0.6 pp
12.9%
Taiwan
−5.1 pp
−1.7 pp
1.8%
Mexico
−5.7 pp
−0.7 pp
2.8%
Brazil
0 pp
+6.4 pp
0%
India
+2.6 pp
−3 pp
2.9%
Hong Kong
−0.1 pp
−4.9 pp
0.03%
Korea
+1.3 pp
−3.7 pp
10%
Spain
−0.1 pp
+4.7 pp
0.02%
Germany
−1.8 pp
+2.8 pp
0.86%
Cambodia
+4.1 pp
+0.2 pp
4.1%
Netherlands
−0.1 pp
+4.1 pp
0.03%
Türkiye
+0.7 pp
−1.7 pp
0.86%
Australia
0 pp
+2.3 pp
0.05%
Poland
−0.1 pp
+1.9 pp
0.01%
UK
−0.2 pp
−1.6 pp
0.27%
Portugal
0 pp
+1.6 pp
0%
Greece
0 pp
+1.2 pp
0%
Canada
−0.3 pp
−0.8 pp
0.9%
Philippines
−1 pp
−0.1 pp
0.74%
UAE
0 pp
+1 pp
0%
Italy
+0.6 pp
+0.4 pp
1.9%
Malaysia
+0.9 pp
−0.1 pp
23.5%
France
−0.1 pp
+0.8 pp
0.27%
Saudi Arabia
0 pp
+0.9 pp
0%
Ukraine
0 pp
+0.9 pp
0%
Israel
+0.2 pp
+0.4 pp
0.42%
Austria
0 pp
+0.6 pp
0.01%
Indonesia
+0.5 pp
+0.1 pp
0.52%
Singapore
−0.2 pp
−0.3 pp
2.6%
Colombia
0 pp
+0.5 pp
0%
Czechia
0 pp
+0.4 pp
0.01%
Belgium
0 pp
+0.3 pp
0.01%
Argentina
0 pp
+0.3 pp
0%
Honduras
0 pp
−0.3 pp
0%
Lebanon
0 pp
+0.3 pp
0%
Bulgaria
0 pp
+0.3 pp
0%
Hungary
0 pp
+0.2 pp
0.01%
Morocco
0 pp
+0.2 pp
0%
South Africa
0 pp
+0.2 pp
0%
Pakistan
0 pp
−0.2 pp
0%
Dominican Republic
−0.1 pp
+0.1 pp
0.06%
Slovenia
0 pp
+0.2 pp
0%
Kazakhstan
0 pp
+0.2 pp
0%
Switzerland
−0.1 pp
−0.1 pp
0.16%
Chile
0 pp
−0.2 pp
0%
Denmark
0 pp
+0.1 pp
0.05%
Russia
0 pp
+0.1 pp
0.02%
Ireland
0 pp
+0.1 pp
0.03%
Croatia
0 pp
−0.1 pp
0.01%
Jordan
+0.1 pp
+0.1 pp
0.06%
Mali
0 pp
+0.1 pp
0%
Armenia
0 pp
+0.1 pp
0.03%
Qatar
0 pp
+0.1 pp
0%
Uruguay
0 pp
−0.1 pp
0%
Estonia
0 pp
+0.1 pp
0%
Sweden
0 pp
+0.1 pp
0.02%
Lithuania
0 pp
+0.1 pp
0.02%
Romania
0 pp
+0.1 pp
0%
Connectors: change in third economies' share of US imports against change in their share of China's exports, 2013–17 to 2018–23 (Gopinath et al., Fig. 4A): Integrated circuits
Largest gain in share of United States’ imports, 2013–2017 to 2018–2023: Malaysia, +9.4 pp (its share of China’s exports −2.2 pp).
→ Change in share of United States’ imports↑ Change in share of China’s exports
Each dot is a third economy: the change between the averages of 2013–2017 and 2018–2023; dot area is its share of the importer’s imports.Source: UN Comtrade, Final data, HS6; mirror rule.
Malaysia
+9.4 pp
−2.2 pp
40.7%
Costa Rica
−8.4 pp
0 pp
0.91%
Singapore
−1.3 pp
−3.9 pp
1.4%
Mexico
+2.9 pp
−1.8 pp
4.2%
Taiwan
+2.2 pp
+2.1 pp
14.5%
Korea
−1 pp
+2.1 pp
6.5%
Vietnam
+0.8 pp
+2.3 pp
5.8%
India
0 pp
+2.6 pp
0.02%
Japan
−2 pp
−0.5 pp
2.7%
Philippines
−0.9 pp
+1 pp
3.6%
Canada
−1.4 pp
−0.1 pp
1.6%
Thailand
+1 pp
−0.1 pp
3.5%
Hong Kong
0 pp
+0.8 pp
0.07%
France
−0.3 pp
−0.4 pp
0.49%
Ireland
+0.5 pp
0 pp
3.6%
Brazil
0 pp
−0.4 pp
0.01%
Austria
−0.3 pp
0 pp
0.14%
Netherlands
0 pp
+0.4 pp
0.03%
Germany
+0.2 pp
−0.1 pp
1.1%
Italy
−0.2 pp
0 pp
0.05%
Israel
+0.2 pp
0 pp
1.9%
Argentina
0 pp
−0.2 pp
0%
Czechia
0 pp
+0.2 pp
0.01%
Indonesia
−0.1 pp
0 pp
0.09%
Poland
0 pp
+0.1 pp
0.01%
Morocco
−0.1 pp
0 pp
0.11%
Slovakia
0 pp
0 pp
0.02%
Hungary
0 pp
0 pp
0.05%
Peru
0 pp
0 pp
0%
Portugal
0 pp
0 pp
0.04%
Belgium
0 pp
0 pp
0.04%
Finland
0 pp
0 pp
0.01%
Algeria
0 pp
0 pp
0%
UK
0 pp
0 pp
0.19%
Bangladesh
0 pp
0 pp
0%
Türkiye
0 pp
0 pp
0.04%
Malta
0 pp
0 pp
0.27%
UAE
0 pp
0 pp
0%
Spain
0 pp
0 pp
0.02%
Nigeria
0 pp
0 pp
0%
Denmark
0 pp
0 pp
0.01%
North Macedonia
0 pp
0 pp
0%
Venezuela
0 pp
0 pp
0%
Australia
0 pp
0 pp
0.03%
Myanmar
0 pp
0 pp
0%
Kuwait
0 pp
0 pp
0%
Romania
0 pp
0 pp
0.01%
Switzerland
0 pp
0 pp
0.09%
Serbia
0 pp
0 pp
0%
Uzbekistan
0 pp
0 pp
0%
Kenya
0 pp
0 pp
0.01%
Macao
0 pp
0 pp
0%
Norway
0 pp
0 pp
0.01%
Greece
0 pp
0 pp
0%
Colombia
0 pp
0 pp
0%
Slovenia
0 pp
0 pp
0%
Mauritius
0 pp
0 pp
0.01%
Egypt
0 pp
0 pp
0%
Russia
0 pp
0 pp
0%
Cambodia
0 pp
0 pp
0%
The same for solar cells, 2022 against 2024, the years the code exists
Largest gain in share of United States’ imports, 2022 to 2024: Korea, +27.2 pp (its share of China’s exports −7.7 pp).
→ Change in share of United States’ imports↑ Change in share of China’s exports
Each dot is a third economy: the change between the averages of 2022 and 2024; dot area is its share of the importer’s imports.Source: UN Comtrade, Final data, HS6; mirror rule.
India
+2.1 pp
+40.4 pp
2.1%
Korea
+27.2 pp
−7.7 pp
30.7%
Malaysia
−29.9 pp
+0.2 pp
31.9%
Thailand
+14.7 pp
−13.6 pp
17.8%
Vietnam
−16.1 pp
−5.5 pp
5.9%
Germany
+0.5 pp
−6.8 pp
1.6%
Türkiye
0 pp
−6.9 pp
0.02%
Laos
+5.3 pp
+0.8 pp
5.3%
Taiwan
−2.7 pp
0 pp
1.4%
Singapore
+0.2 pp
−2.2 pp
0.16%
Cambodia
+0.3 pp
−1.6 pp
1.5%
Russia
−0.1 pp
+1.5 pp
0%
France
0 pp
−1.5 pp
0%
Canada
−0.3 pp
−1.2 pp
0.01%
Slovenia
0 pp
−0.8 pp
0%
Indonesia
−0.2 pp
+0.6 pp
1.4%
Spain
0 pp
−0.6 pp
0%
Jordan
0 pp
−0.4 pp
0%
Australia
−0.4 pp
0 pp
0%
Mexico
−0.2 pp
+0.1 pp
0.01%
Italy
−0.1 pp
+0.2 pp
0%
Netherlands
0 pp
−0.2 pp
0%
Japan
0 pp
−0.1 pp
0.3%
UK
0 pp
−0.1 pp
0.01%
Hong Kong
0 pp
−0.1 pp
0%
Mauritius
+0.1 pp
0 pp
0.05%
Philippines
0 pp
0 pp
0.06%
Switzerland
0 pp
+0.1 pp
0%
Belgium
0 pp
−0.1 pp
0%
Bangladesh
0 pp
0 pp
0.01%
Finland
0 pp
0 pp
0%
Hungary
0 pp
0 pp
0%
Czechia
0 pp
0 pp
0%
Bulgaria
0 pp
0 pp
0.01%
Norway
0 pp
0 pp
0%
Denmark
0 pp
0 pp
0%
Dominican Republic
0 pp
0 pp
0%
Sweden
0 pp
0 pp
0%
Slovakia
0 pp
0 pp
0%
Vietnam: all goods imports by supplier
China’s share of Vietnam’s all goods imports: 28.2% in 2013, 42.1% in 2024.
0%20%40%60%
2013201520172019202120232024
China42%
Source: UN Comtrade, Final data, HS6; mirror rule.
2013
28.2%
–
+15.5%
yes
2014
29.8%
+1.6 pp
+12%
yes
2015
30.2%
+0.4 pp
+11.9%
yes
2016
28.8%
−1.3 pp
+5.9%
yes
2017
27.7%
−1.1 pp
+21.7%
yes
2018
28%
+0.3 pp
+10.7%
yes
2019
30.2%
+2.2 pp
+7%
yes
2020
32.5%
+2.2 pp
+3.7%
yes
2021
33.6%
+1.2 pp
+25.9%
yes
2022
33.3%
−0.3 pp
+8.1%
yes
2023
34.8%
+1.4 pp
−9.8%
yes
2024
42.1%
+7.4 pp
+20.6%
no
Mexico: all goods imports by supplier
China’s share of Mexico’s all goods imports: 16.1% in 2013, 20.5% in 2024.
0%10%20%30%
2013201520172019202120232024
China20%
Source: UN Comtrade, Final data, HS6; mirror rule.
2013
16.1%
–
+2.8%
yes
2014
16.6%
+0.5 pp
+4.5%
yes
2015
17.7%
+1.1 pp
−1%
yes
2016
18%
+0.3 pp
−2.1%
yes
2017
17.7%
−0.3 pp
+8.6%
yes
2018
18%
+0.3 pp
+10.5%
yes
2019
18.3%
+0.3 pp
−2%
yes
2020
19.2%
+0.9 pp
−15.8%
yes
2021
20.1%
+0.9 pp
+31.5%
yes
2022
19.7%
−0.4 pp
+19.8%
yes
2023
19.1%
−0.6 pp
−0.1%
yes
2024
20.5%
+1.4 pp
+5.2%
yes
The scenario
Put a tariff on China in one stage (solar modules by default; cells or chips), entered as the share of China's flow it removes, and see which connectors fill the US gap and how much of that stage and the one above they buy from China
Solar modules imports of United States by supplier, 2017: before and after
Flow from China to United States removed1.2%of world solar modules trade
Other suppliers would have to ship+10%more to United States, to keep its supply whole
United States: imports at risk8.4%of its imports of the product
Supply kept whole: the other suppliers fill the gap in proportion to their shares. The last column is how much of the product each of them buys from the partner itself.
Supplier
Share now
Share after
Change, pp
Its own imports from the partner
Malaysia
24.1%
26.5%
+2.4 pp
23%
China
16.7%
8.4%
−8.4 pp
Korea
14.6%
16.1%
+1.5 pp
44.6%
Vietnam
10.3%
11.3%
+1 pp
19%
Japan
8.4%
9.2%
+0.8 pp
56.7%
Thailand
6.6%
7.2%
+0.7 pp
22.3%
Smaller suppliers
4.5%
4.9%
+0.4 pp
Mexico
4.5%
4.9%
+0.4 pp
19.2%
Italy
3%
3.3%
+0.3 pp
19%
Singapore
2.4%
2.6%
+0.2 pp
21.1%
Canada
2.2%
2.4%
+0.2 pp
31.6%
Taiwan
1.6%
1.8%
+0.2 pp
47.7%
Germany
1.2%
1.3%
+0.1 pp
19.1%
The largest other exporters, by share of world exports
Malaysia 13.3%
Japan 10.6%
Taiwan 9.5%
Korea 6.7%
Vietnam 4.4%
First-round arithmetic on trade shares, not a forecast: an importer’s exposure is its import share from the shocked suppliers × the cut. No stocks, no new suppliers, no price changes.
The China → connector → US paths read the connectors' imports from China of the same stage and the stage above (cells from 2022, wafers before).
Source: UN Comtrade, Final data, HS6; mirror rule; shares of 2017.
Limits
Gross trade cannot tell reallocation from rerouting: a Vietnamese export to the US can carry Chinese inputs, which Schulze and Xin separate with value-added data and a synthetic control, and the BIS bulletin with firm-level supplier links. Gopinath et al. estimate a gravity model with fixed effects and Qiu, Xia and Yetman use volumes; our shares are descriptive, in current dollars, and use the narrow blocs only (the papers' blocs from UN votes are not in the data).