Case 3 · Events 1, 6

Trade is splitting into blocs, with connectors between

Is trade splitting along geopolitical lines, and are “connector” economies bridging the blocs or just relabelling Chinese goods?

  • 5papers
  • 8measures on our data
  • Add a tariffscenario

What the papers found

IMF Working Paper WP/24/76 ·

Changing Global Linkages: A New Cold War?

Gopinath, Gourinchas, Presbitero & Topalova (2024)

Since the war in Ukraine, trade and FDI between geopolitically distant blocs fell relative to flows within blocs, “roughly 12% and 20%, respectively”; “nonaligned ‘connector’ countries are rapidly gaining importance”.

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World Bank Policy Research Working Paper WPS10593 ·

Is US Trade Policy Reshaping Global Supply Chains ?

Freund, Mattoo, Mulabdic & Ruta (2023)

In US tariff-line import data, “China’s share of US imports fell from 22 to 16 percent” between 2017 and 2022, and the paper shows that the decline is due to US tariffs.

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IMF Working Paper WP/25/129 ·

Demystifying Trade Patterns In A Fragmenting World

Schulze & Xin (2025)

Of six Asian connectors, only Vietnam shows clear evidence: “Vietnam appears to have benefited from trade reallocation, with increased domestic content in its exports to the US”, instead of significant transshipment of Chinese exports.

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BIS Bulletin 78 ·

Mapping the realignment of global value chains

Qiu, Shin & Zhang (2023)

Firm-level supplier data show chains from China to the US lengthening, “where firms from other jurisdictions, notably in Asia, have interposed themselves in the supply chain”.

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What our data show

The papers’ questions measured again on UN Comtrade records. Each reading below is written from these numbers, not from the papers.

Trade between the narrow West and East blocs as a share of world trade, 1990–2024

Trade between West (narrow bloc) and East (narrow bloc): 1.6% of world trade in 1990, 9.3% in 2024. Peak: 11.9% in 2021.

Shares of world trade in the product; trade with economies in neither bloc is the rest.Source: UN Comtrade, Final data, HS6; mirror rule.

The same by month, 12-month sums, to December 2024 (the last complete month)

Trade between West (narrow bloc) and East (narrow bloc): 11.3% of world trade in Jan 2018, 9.3% in Dec 2024. Peak: 12.2% in Mar 2021.

Shares of world trade in the product; trade with economies in neither bloc is the rest.Source: UN Comtrade monthly data, all reporters that filed; mirror rule; lens L (12-month sum).

Shares of US imports by partner, all goods

China’s share of United States’ all goods imports: 19.7% in 2013, 13.8% in 2024.

Source: UN Comtrade, Final data, HS6; mirror rule.

China's share of US imports, 2017 against 2022 (Freund et al.: 22 to 16 percent)

China’s share of United States’ all goods imports: 21.9% in 2017, 17.1% in 2022 (−4.8 pp).

Source: UN Comtrade, Final data, HS6; mirror rule.

Connectors: change in third economies' share of US imports against change in their share of China's exports, 2013–17 to 2018–23 (Gopinath et al., Fig. 4A): All goods

Largest gain in share of United States’ imports, 2013–2017 to 2018–2023: Vietnam, +1.6 pp (its share of China’s exports +1 pp).

→ Change in share of United States’ imports↑ Change in share of China’s exports

Each dot is a third economy: the change between the averages of 2013–2017 and 2018–2023; dot area is its share of the importer’s imports.Source: UN Comtrade, Final data, HS6; mirror rule.

Connectors: change in third economies' share of US imports against change in their share of China's exports, 2013–17 to 2018–23 (Gopinath et al., Fig. 4A): Solar modules

Largest gain in share of United States’ imports, 2013–2017 to 2018–2023: Vietnam, +19.1 pp (its share of China’s exports +4.5 pp).

→ Change in share of United States’ imports↑ Change in share of China’s exports

Each dot is a third economy: the change between the averages of 2013–2017 and 2018–2023; dot area is its share of the importer’s imports.Source: UN Comtrade, Final data, HS6; mirror rule.

Connectors: change in third economies' share of US imports against change in their share of China's exports, 2013–17 to 2018–23 (Gopinath et al., Fig. 4A): Integrated circuits

Largest gain in share of United States’ imports, 2013–2017 to 2018–2023: Malaysia, +9.4 pp (its share of China’s exports −2.2 pp).

→ Change in share of United States’ imports↑ Change in share of China’s exports

Each dot is a third economy: the change between the averages of 2013–2017 and 2018–2023; dot area is its share of the importer’s imports.Source: UN Comtrade, Final data, HS6; mirror rule.

The same for solar cells, 2022 against 2024, the years the code exists

Largest gain in share of United States’ imports, 2022 to 2024: Korea, +27.2 pp (its share of China’s exports −7.7 pp).

→ Change in share of United States’ imports↑ Change in share of China’s exports

Each dot is a third economy: the change between the averages of 2022 and 2024; dot area is its share of the importer’s imports.Source: UN Comtrade, Final data, HS6; mirror rule.

Vietnam: all goods imports by supplier

China’s share of Vietnam’s all goods imports: 28.2% in 2013, 42.1% in 2024.

Source: UN Comtrade, Final data, HS6; mirror rule.

Mexico: all goods imports by supplier

China’s share of Mexico’s all goods imports: 16.1% in 2013, 20.5% in 2024.

Source: UN Comtrade, Final data, HS6; mirror rule.

The scenario

Put a tariff on China in one stage (solar modules by default; cells or chips), entered as the share of China's flow it removes, and see which connectors fill the US gap and how much of that stage and the one above they buy from China

Solar modules imports of United States by supplier, 2017: before and after

  • Flow from China to United States removed1.2%of world solar modules trade
  • Other suppliers would have to ship+10%more to United States, to keep its supply whole
  • United States: imports at risk8.4%of its imports of the product
Supply kept whole: the other suppliers fill the gap in proportion to their shares. The last column is how much of the product each of them buys from the partner itself.
SupplierShare nowShare afterChange, ppIts own imports from the partner
Malaysia24.1%26.5%+2.4 pp23%
China16.7%8.4%−8.4 pp
Korea14.6%16.1%+1.5 pp44.6%
Vietnam10.3%11.3%+1 pp19%
Japan8.4%9.2%+0.8 pp56.7%
Thailand6.6%7.2%+0.7 pp22.3%
Smaller suppliers4.5%4.9%+0.4 pp
Mexico4.5%4.9%+0.4 pp19.2%
Italy3%3.3%+0.3 pp19%
Singapore2.4%2.6%+0.2 pp21.1%
Canada2.2%2.4%+0.2 pp31.6%
Taiwan1.6%1.8%+0.2 pp47.7%
Germany1.2%1.3%+0.1 pp19.1%

The largest other exporters, by share of world exports

  • Malaysia 13.3%
  • Japan 10.6%
  • Taiwan 9.5%
  • Korea 6.7%
  • Vietnam 4.4%

First-round arithmetic on trade shares, not a forecast: an importer’s exposure is its import share from the shocked suppliers × the cut. No stocks, no new suppliers, no price changes.

The China → connector → US paths read the connectors' imports from China of the same stage and the stage above (cells from 2022, wafers before).

Source: UN Comtrade, Final data, HS6; mirror rule; shares of 2017.

Limits

Gross trade cannot tell reallocation from rerouting: a Vietnamese export to the US can carry Chinese inputs, which Schulze and Xin separate with value-added data and a synthetic control, and the BIS bulletin with firm-level supplier links. Gopinath et al. estimate a gravity model with fixed effects and Qiu, Xia and Yetman use volumes; our shares are descriptive, in current dollars, and use the narrow blocs only (the papers' blocs from UN votes are not in the data).

Further reading

datasteg: the flow sites